Eighteen months from publication Suzan Yildiz, Head of Planning at Olswang LLP considers the operation of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in practice
From its very conception, the NPPF incited hyperbole from the pro-development and environmental lobby alike. The (then) planning minister proclaimed “development is growth”, its authors declared it ‘a nearly perfect planning framework’ and the Campaign to Protect Rural England prophesied erosion of environmental protection. Did the NPPF herald an era of growth or mend ‘a broken planning system’? To answer those questions, we must consider its objectives and separate reality from hyperbole. The stated rationale for planning reforms1 was:
- To restore collaborative democracy and local control;
- Rebalance the system in favour of sustainable development;
- To produce a simpler, quicker, less bureaucratic system;
- And as is widely acknowledged, to plan for growth.
Plan-Making
Overall, the NPPF functions effectively as ‘a consolidation’ of national planning policy but questions remain as to its impacts. The primacy of the local plan was rightly preserved in making decisions unless material considerations dictate otherwise 2. The sum of the NPPF’s aims places crucial importance on an up-to-date development plan. A planning system that is “genuinely plan-led, empowering local people to shape their surroundings, with succinct local and neighbourhood plans” is among twelve core planning principles3. In default of an up-to-date plan or a policy lacuna, a presumptive approach to sustainable development dictates the grant of planning permission unless adverse impacts demonstrably outweigh the benefits (paragraph 14, NPPF).
Arguably, a positive impact on effective and timely plan-making is the litmus test of the NPPF’s success and its localist leanings. Conversely, if at its best the NPPF operates primarily to redress failings in the local planning process through a presumptive grant of permission, it smacks of the centralism it disavowed. Albeit that the principle of not delaying sustainable development due to short-comings in plan-making is sound.
Ironically thus far the NPPF is failing in the plan-making arena. According to research by Savills4, 50% of 190 LPAs lack a fully up-to-date plan. In terms of providing a five year housing land supply, a central tenet of national housing policy, performance is evidently poor rendering LPAs vulnerable on housing appeals. 33% of LPAs lack a five year housing supply. 34% have to apply the punitive 20% buffer due to persistent historic under-performance. At a time of housing crisis and stiff competition for land, the South-East has seen an overall 8.8% reduction in housing allocations. The plan-making process is not keeping pace with housing market realities. It is reported that as few as 6.8% of 164 LPAs have prepared a statement of compliance with the NPPF. Planning Inspectorate figures show that since publication of the NPPF, only 7 out of 66 strategic development plan documents submitted have proven sound. This compares lamentably with the figure of 50 adopted development plan documents in 2009 under the predecessor regime – itself a poor outcome.
The Cooperation Conundrum
Arguably progress with local plans was hindered by a double-whammy of abolishing Regional Strategies and a plethora of planning reforms which did not aid planning certainty. In lieu of Regional Strategies, Section 110, the Localism Act 2011 introduced a ‘duty to cooperate’ with neighbouring LPAs in respect of strategic cross-boundary issues, such as plan-making.
The rationale for abolishing Regional Strategies was a localist one – the impacts are less so. In the absence of central housing targets and diminishing resources, LPAs have struggled to prepare strategic plans and targets particularly at district level. On one hand LPAs are required to steer a localist course (e.g. neighbourhood planning), on the other, to summon the political will to cooperatively plan for strategic housing and growth. Seeking release of Green Belt land for housing from one authority for the benefit of another’s housing targets is a political ‘hardsell’. Hence, the cooperation conundrum as exemplified between Birmingham and Coventry City Councils in promoting their respective local plans. Just over 50% of Birmingham’s 80,000 housing target by 2031 can be met within its urban area. Birmingham, therefore, depends on its neighbours to meet its housing targets. Its ambitious plans for growth in turn require sufficient housing. In March 2013, Coventry was forced to withdraw its Core Strategy for failure to cooperate with Birmingham in preparing a Strategic Housing Market Assessment.
The duty can seem like a conundrum, but it is doubtlessly an opportunity that LPAs must rapidly realise. The 2011 Act is criticised for lack of prescriptive clarity, yet with a purposive approach to interpretation the duty begins to take shape. The draft National Planning Policy Guidance (NPPG)5 offers some guidance. The duty is evidently active and ongoing with a view to maximizing the effectiveness of outcomes on cross-cutting issues. It is more than mere consultation and permeates the plan-making process from evidence stage through to formulation of policies and adoption. Unless there is meaningful engagement, non-compliance will delay and undermine the soundness of plans. In this light, if Coventry engaged positively with Birmingham on housing targets, its communities would in turn benefit from the jobs and growth within Birmingham’s boundaries.
In a post-NPPF world, the duty demands a long-term view. It presents an opportunity for creative and collaborative democracy with a view to strategic cross boundary growth. Political buy-in will be challenging, but the alternatives of permissive appeals and unsound plans are in danger of disempowering local communities. Put simply, LPAs must espouse a new mindset “United we stand, Divided we fall”. Failing this, or possibly in any event, more legislative reform is likely to follow to address the housing crisis, perhaps mandating new settlements through legislation.
The government can do more to help. Rather than punitive intervention, ‘collaborative democracy’ between central and local levels is needed. It is conceivable, and would be far more productive, to establish task-forces to aid LPAs short on resources or expertise with plan-making functions. For example, to prepare viability evidence or strategic market assessments or compliance with the duty to cooperate, some instructive case studies in the new NPPG would be a good place to start.
Conclusion
The impacts of the NPPF range between the good, the bad and the ugly. The NPPF is emphatic about ‘the plan-led system’, but its impact on speeding up plan-making has been lacklustre. This undoubtedly constitutes ‘the bad’ among its impacts. As seen in the appeal context (to be considered in my next article) the NPPF bares its teeth when there is a lacuna in local policy. This is an inherent tension between the localism agenda and its centralist impact on appeal. There are no winners when plan-making fails. Success through appeal is short-term at best. Planning by appeal is an ineffective way to promote strategic growth or housing, and perceived negatively by local communities. Out of date plans do not provide developers and investors with the requisite certainty to promote development. Success on appeal is a poor substitute for planning certainty. The government’s aims of improving a sluggish system cannot be judged a success. There is room for improvement at the top.
1 “Open Source Planning”, Conservative Party, Policy Green Paper No. 14
2 Section 38(6), the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. Also, para 150 and Annex 1, NPPF
3 Second bullet of ‘decision-taking’ part, paragraph 17, NPPF
4 “Assessing the impact of the NPPF”, March 2013
5 Published online in Beta version and open to consultation until 14 October 2013
The next installment of ‘NPPF: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ will appear in January’s edition of Planning and Building Control Today.
Suzan Yildiz
Head of Planning
Olswang LLP
